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Abstract—This work considers the problem of attack-resilient
sensor fusion in an autonomous system where multiple sensors
measure the same physical variable. A malicious attacker may
corrupt a subset of these sensors and send wrong measurements
to the controller on their behalf, potentially compromising the
safety of the system. We formalize the goals and constraints of
such an attacker who also wants to avoid detection by the system.
We argue that the attacker’s capabilities depend on the amount
of information she has about the correct sensors’ measurements.
In the presence of a shared bus where messages are broadcast
to all components connected to the network, the attacker may
consider all other measurements before sending her own in
order to achieve maximal impact. Consequently, we investigate
effects of communication schedules on sensor fusion performance.
We provide worst- and average-case results in support of the
Ascending schedule, where sensors send their measurements in a
fixed succession based on their precision, starting from the most
precise sensors. Finally, we provide a case study to illustrate the
use of this approach.

I. I NTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of sensing technology available to
modern Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), the problem of performing effective sensor fusion is more important than ever.
For example, modern automotive systems have multiple ways
of estimating speed; combining their sensor data to provide
more accurate estimates to the controller can have a significant
impact on the system’s performance and reliability. In addition,
having diverse sensors with different accuracy and reliability
decreases the system’s dependence on a particular sensor
and increases its robustness to environmental disturbances
(e.g., variations in terrain in automotive CPS).
As the system’s autonomy increases, so does the concern
about its security. In modern vehicles, a malicious attacker may
deceive the controller into performing a dangerous action by
altering the measurements of some sensors [1], [2]. Depending
on the attacker’s goal and capabilities, the consequences may
range from minor disturbances in performance to crashes and
loss of human lives. Consequently, performing attack-resilient
sensor fusion is essential for the safety of such systems.
The problem of sensor fusion has drawn a lot of attention
in recent years. Usually, sensor fusion methods assume a
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probabilistic model of each sensor and combine their measurements accordingly [3]. In particular, each sensor gives
a numeric measurement that is corrupted by noise with a
known distribution (e.g., Gaussian). In an alternative approach,
an interval is constructed around each sensor measurement,
containing all points that may be the true value (e.g., set
membership methods [4]). One of the first works with this
viewpoint [5] also considers the case where some of the
sensors might be faulty (i.e., providing intervals that do not
contain the true value); the author provides worst-case analysis
when the number of faulty intervals can be bounded. An
extension of [5] relaxes the worst-case guarantees in favor of
obtaining more precise fused measurements [6]. In addition,
intervals can be assumed to have a predefined distribution
on the true value so that again statistical analysis can be
performed [7]. Finally, one can use sensor information not
only to aid control but also for fault detection [5], [8].
In this work, we consider the problem of attack-resilient sensor fusion for abstract sensors where each sensor’s measurement is converted to an interval by the controller. The width
of the interval reflects the accuracy of the sensor – a larger
interval means less confidence in provided measurements. This
is a very general scenario as it does not make any assumptions
about system dynamics nor about the distribution of sensor
measurement noise. Instead, the intervals are constructed based
on the manufacturer’s sensor specifications and implementation guarantees (e.g., sensor precision, implementation jitter).
We propose the use of the sensor fusion algorithm outlined
by Marzullo [5], which produces a fusion interval based on
an assumed number of faulty sensors (see Section II).
Furthermore, we introduce the notion of a compromised
(i.e., attacked) sensor, which may not be faulty but still acts in
a detrimental way to the system. Assuming that the attacker
knows the algorithm implemented by the system, her goal is
to maximize the uncertainty in the system (i.e., the size of the
fusion interval) while staying undetected. We show that given
these two objectives and a fixed number of sensors that can be
corrupted, the attacker’s capabilities depend on the number of
uncompromised intervals that she is aware of before sending
her ‘measurements’ to the system. As is true in many CPS,
we assume sensors communicate over a shared bus (e.g., CAN
bus) and messages can be seen from everyone. Thus, if the
attacker sends her intervals last, she can maximize the width of
the fusion interval based on placements of the correct intervals.
Based on these observations, we investigate how different
communication schedules affect the attacker’s capabilities to
compromise the system. We give theoretic results that show

dn/2e the width of the fusion interval is bounded above by
the width of some interval (not necessarily correct). Finally, if
f ≥ dn/2e then the fusion interval can be arbitrarily large and
may not contain the true value. Thus, in our work we assume
that the f used in the algorithm always satisfies f < dn/2e,
causing the fusion interval to be bounded.
B. System Description and Problem Statement
Fig. 1. Marzullo’s fusion interval for three values of f . Dashed horizontal
line separates sensor intervals from fusion intervals in all figures in this work.

that the worst-case (i.e., largest width) fusion interval does not
change if the attacker controls the largest intervals but will in
general increase when the most precise sensors are attacked.
In addition, we provide experimental results and a case study,
and argue that systems applying the fusion algorithm discussed
in this paper should use the Ascending schedule, which orders
sensors according to the size of their intervals starting with the
most precise. The contributions of this paper are as follows: (1)
attack formalization through the goals and constraints of the
attacker, (2) analysis of the impact of different communication
schedules on the attacker’s capabilities, and (3) an illustration
of this approach on an autonomous vehicle case-study.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines
Marzullo’s sensor fusion algorithm and specifies the problem
addressed in this paper. Section III formalizes the goals and
constraints of the attacker, and presents worst-case results
regarding the size of the fusion interval. Section IV studies
the effects of the communication schedules on sensor fusion.
Finally, Section V concludes the work.
II. P ROBLEM S TATEMENT AND P RELIMINARIES
In this section, we describe the sensor fusion algorithm [5]
before formalizing the problem considered in this paper.
A. Marzullo’s Algorithm
The inputs to Marzullo’s sensor fusion algorithm are n
real intervals, and a number f that denotes the number of
faulty intervals the system might have. The fusion interval
is then computed as follows: its lower bound is the smallest
point contained in at least n − f intervals and the upper
bound is the largest such point. Intuitively, the algorithm works
conservatively: since at least n − f intervals are correct, any
point that is contained in n−f intervals may be the true value,
and hence it is included in the fusion interval.
The algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 1. When f = 0 and the
system is confident that every interval is correct, the fusion
interval is just the intersection of all intervals. When at most
one sensor can be faulty (f = 1), the fusion interval is the
convex hull of all points contained in at least four intervals.
Similarly, when f = 2 the fusion interval contains the convex
hull of all points that lie in at least three intervals. As shown
in Fig. 1, as f increases so does the uncertainty represented as
the size of the fusion interval. In particular, for f = n − 1 the
fusion interval is the convex hull of the union of all intervals.
Three important results of this work are worth noting. If f <
dn/3e then the width of the fusion interval is bounded above
by the width of some correct interval. Additionally, if f <

We consider a system with n sensors measuring the state
of the same physical variable and communicating with the
controller over a shared bus. Each sensor provides the controller with a measurement; an interval containing all possible
values of the true state is then computed based on that sensor’s
precision, implementation guarantees and sampling jitter. In
particular, if the manufacturer’s precision guarantee is δ, then
an interval of size 2δ centered at the sensor’s measurement
is constructed; the interval size is further increased if the
worst-case guarantees for sampling jitter (and implementation
limitations) are considered (e.g., the design of intervals in [5]).
Thus, we assume the intervals’ widths are known and fixed.
A sensor is said to be correct if the interval contains the true
value, and faulty otherwise. In addition, each sensor transmits
its measurement to the controller according to a predefined
communication schedule (i.e., in its predefined slot). Once
the controller has received all n intervals, it will perform the
fusion algorithm with a predefined f (e.g., conservative upper
bound) such that f < dn/2e, followed by the attack detection
procedure which discards all intervals that do not intersect the
fusion interval (for more details see Section III-A).
1) Attack Model: In this work, we assume sensors are not
faulty but can be under attack. In addition, when the attacker
takes control of a sensor, she is still able to obtain correct
measurements from the sensor before deciding what value
(correct or manipulated) to send to the controller. Note that the
measurements of all compromised sensors provide additional
information to the attacker regarding the true value. Thus, we
use ∆ to denote the intersection of the correct measurements
from all corrupted sensors. Assuming that the attacker knows
the sensor fusion algorithm, her goal is to maximize the width
of the fusion interval while staying undetected.
2) Problem Statement: The problem considered in this
work is two-fold. We first analyze what the best policy for the
attacker is, given her objective. Then we note that her actions
and capabilities depend on what intervals she has seen before
sending hers. Therefore, our goal is to find a communication
schedule that will minimize the attacker’s impact. We examine
specific schedules used to transmit sensor measurements and
define metrics that can be used to compare them.
C. Notation
We use N , where |N | = n, to denote the set of all sensors
and L to denote the set of the lengths of all intervals. In
addition, SN ,f denotes the fusion interval given all sensors in
N , for a predefined (fixed) f , while in general, SP,f denotes
the fusion interval for a predefined f using the intervals in the
set P. Since we distinguish between the number of attacked
sensors and the input to Marzullo’s algorithm f , let fa denote

the number of attacked sensors, and we assume that fa ≤ f .
Finally, C denotes the set of all correct sensors, where |C| = c
(i.e., c + fa = n). Note that SC,0 is the intersection of all
intervals in C. For each interval s, let us and ls denote its
upper and lower bound, respectively (s = [ls , us ]), and let
|s| = us − ls . Similarly, uSN ,f and lSN ,f denote the upper
and lower bound of the fusion interval SN ,f .
III. ATTACK P OLICY AND W ORST-C ASE A NALYSIS
This section focuses on the attacker’s capabilities and relates
them with the number of intervals she has seen before sending
hers. We start by formalizing the attacker’s goals and constraints before providing worst-case results when fa < dn/2e.
A. Attack Policy
1) Staying Stealthy: Due to the utilized sensor fusion
algorithm, the detection mechanism the system uses is to check
for overlap with the fusion interval; if an interval does not
intersect the fusion interval, then it must be compromised [5].
To avoid detection, the attacker has two modes – passive and
active. The attacker starts in passive mode where she has to
include ∆ in her interval and use the rest of her interval (if
any) to maximize the size of the fusion interval. The entire ∆
has to be included to ensure overlap with the fusion interval
(otherwise, any excluded point may be the true value).1
The attacker can switch to active mode when the number
of transmitted sensor measurements is at least n − f − far ,
where far is the number of unsent compromised intervals. In
this mode there are no constraints on the placement of her
intervals as long as overlap with at least n − f − 1 intervals
is guaranteed, which ensures overlap with the fusion interval
(note that she may have to protect her earlier intervals). The
reason this attack is undetectable is that the attacker’s intervals
will always intersect the fusion interval, and thus the system
would not be able to determine which sensors are malicious.
2) Maximizing the size of the fusion interval: If the attacker
has full knowledge of all correct intervals then her policy
can be formulated as the optimization problem with variables
a1 , . . . , afa representing the attacked intervals:
max |SN ,f |
a1 ,...,af a
(1)
s.t. SN,f ∩ ai 6= ∅, i = 1, . . . , fa .
This problem formulation leads to the following definition.
Definition 1: Given placements of the correct intervals, an
attack policy is optimal if the fusion interval has the same size
as in the solution of problem (1).
Thus, the policy described in (1) is optimal by definition.2
We argue, however, that in general there exists no optimal
policy for the attacker if she is not aware of all correct intervals
before sending hers.3 This is illustrated in Fig. 2. Suppose the
attacker has only seen interval s1 and obtained interval a1
1 A generalization of this work will include a fault model over time for each
sensor (e.g., a sensor is compromised only if it is faulty more than f out of
w measurements). Thus, a sensor may have a temporary fault without being
discarded as compromised.
2 It is worth noting here that the optimal policy need not be unique.
3 Note that this problem can be mapped to the problem of optimization with
limited information.

Fig. 2. An example showing that if attacker (sinusoid) has not seen all
intervals then she has no policy that guarantees fusion interval is maximized.

from her sensor before sending her interval. One option for
her is to send a1 (1); this would not be optimal if s2 appears as
illustrated.4 Alternatively, if the attacker tries to attack on both
sides (interval a1 (2) from Fig. 2), then s2 could still appear
as shown, in which case a1 (2) would not be optimal.
In cases such as Fig. 2, a reasonable goal for the attacker
is to maximize the expected performance over all possible
measurements obtained by correct and compromised unseen
sensors. Formally, an instance of the following problem is
solved for each compromised interval ak
max

ak ,...,af a

E |SN ,f |

CkR

(2)
s.t. SN,f ∩ ai 6= ∅ i = k, . . . , fa ,
where CkR is the set of all possible placements of correct
intervals that will be transmitted after interval ak , and E
denotes the expectation operator.
There do, however, exist cases in which there is an optimal
policy for the attacker even if she is not aware of all correct intervals. In particular, there exist placements of the seen correct
intervals that provide the attacker with enough information to
place her intervals in an optimal way. To formalize the above
statement, let C S be the set of seen correct intervals and let C R
be defined as above. Let ln−f −fa be the (n−f −fa )th smallest
seen lower bound and let un−f −fa be the (n−f −fa )th largest
seen upper bound. Finally, let mmin be the attacked sensor
with smallest width.
Theorem 1: Suppose n − f − fa ≤ |C S | < n − fa , and the
attacker is scheduled to transmit in consecutive slots. There
exists an optimal attack policy if one of the following is true:
1) ∀si , sj ∈ C S , lsi = lsj , usi = usj and ∀s ∈ C R ,
|s| ≤ (|mmin | − |SC S ∪∆,0 |)/2
2) |mmin | ≥ un−f −fa − ln−f −fa and ∀s ∈ C R ,
|s| ≤ min {lSCS ∪∆,0 − ln−f −fa , un−f −fa − uSCS ∪∆,0 }
Proof: First suppose the first statement is true. We argue
that the optimal policy for the attacker is to attack on both sides
of seen intervals. For any s ∈ C R , s must overlap with at least
one point in SC S ∪∆,0 (the overlap must contain the true value)
and since |s| ≤ (|mmin |−|SC S ∪∆,0 |)/2 then s will necessarily
overlap with all malicious sensors implementing the above
policy. Note that since f < dn/2e, the fusion interval cannot
be larger than the union of all correct intervals. Therefore, this
policy is optimal because the attacker can guarantee that all
her intervals contain all correct intervals. Fig. 3(a) illustrates
this case. All seen correct intervals coincide, and the attacker’s
intervals are large enough to guarantee that attacking on both
sides will make sure all unseen intervals are included.
4 The symmetric counterexample exists if the attacker tries to attack on the
right (this case is not shown in Fig. 2).

(a) Case 1. Attacker has seen s1
and s2 , while the unseen s3 is
small enough.

(b) Case 2. Attacker has seen
s1 and s2 , while the unseen s3
is small enough.

Fig. 3. Examples of the two cases of Theorem 1. Attacked intervals are
indicated by sinusoids.

Now suppose the second case is true. Then the attacked intervals are large enough to contain both ln−f −fa and un−f −fa ,
thus making sure the fusion interval is [ln−f −fa , un−f −fa ].
This attack is optimal since the unseen intervals are all small
enough to not change the positions of points un−f −fa and
ln−f −fa . Fig. 3(b) presents an example of this case. The
unseen interval, s3 , cannot change the largest and smallest
points contained in at least one correct interval.
The conditions in Theorem 1 hold when the unseen correct
intervals are smaller than certain thresholds. Thus, Theorem 1
suggests that from the optimality perspective it is better for the
attacker to know the positions of the larger correct intervals
as they can be used to further extend the fusion interval.
B. Worst-Case Analysis
This section provides worst-case results given the attacker’s
goals and constraints. The following Theorem specifies a
worst-case upper bound on the size of the fusion interval.
Theorem 2: Let sc1 and sc2 be the two largest-width correct
sensors. Then |SN ,f | ≤ |sc1 | + |sc2 |.
Proof: Let sl and su be the two correct intervals with
smallest lower bound and largest upper bound, respectively.
Since f < dn/2e, the lower bound of SN ,f cannot be smaller
than the lower bound of sl and its upper bound cannot be
larger than the upper bound of su . Thus, the width of SN ,f is
bounded by the sum of the widths of sl and su because any
two correct intervals must intersect. Hence the width of SN ,f
is bounded by the sum of the two largest correct intervals.
Theorem 2 provides a conservative bound because it does
not take into consideration the sizes of attacked intervals and
can only be achieved when at least two correct sensors intersect at exactly one point, namely the true value. Consequently,
we formulate the following theorems that specify bounds on
the fusion interval based on the size of the attacked intervals.
To formulate the theorems, we use the following notation.
Given a system of n sensors and a set of predefined lengths,
L, let Sna be the worst-case (largest width) fusion interval
when no sensor is attacked. With SF we denote the worstcase fusion interval for a fixed set of attacked sensors F,
|F| = fa , whereas Sfwc
is the worst-case fusion interval for
a
a given number of attacked sensors, fa . Finally, we refer to
the set of n fixed (i.e., specific) intervals as a “configuration”.
Theorem 3: If the fa largest intervals are under attack, then
|Sna | = |SF |.
Proof: Note that |SF | < |Sna | is impossible since the
attacker can send the correct measurements from her sensors.
Thus, suppose |SF | > |Sna |. Let SC,0 be the intersection of

(a) Attacking the biggest intervals does not change the worst
case in the system.

(b) Attacking the smallest intervals can achieve the absolute
worst case.

Fig. 4. Illustrations of Theorems 3 and 4.

the correct intervals in the configuration that achieves SF .
Suppose SF extends SC,0 on the right (note that the argument
for the left side is symmetric) by some distance d and let A
be the rightmost point contained in SF . Since f < dn/2e, A
must lie in at least one correct interval sc . Since sc is correct it
must contain SC,0 , which implies d + |SC,0 | ≤ |sc | ≤ |smax |,
where smax is the largest correct interval. Let s be any attacked
interval that contains A. Because |s| ≥ |smax |, s can be placed
to contain both A and SC,0 . Since this can be done for all
attacked intervals containing A, the same worst-case fusion
interval can be achieved if no intervals were attacked.
Fig. 4(a) illustrates this theorem. Intervals a1 and a2 are
under attack and both do not contain the true value, which
is at the intersection of the other sensors. Since a1 and a2
are the largest intervals, they can be moved and can be made
correct while preserving the size of the fusion interval, hence
the same worst case can be achieved with correct intervals.
Theorem 4: |Sfwc
| is achievable if the fa smallest intervals
a
are under attack.
Proof: Note that if |Sfwc
| = |Sna |, the theorem follows
a
trivially. Consider the case |Sfwc
| > |Sna |. Suppose |Sfwc
|
a
a
is not achievable if the fa smallest intervals are attacked.
Let S be the configuration with fa corrupted intervals that
achieves |Sfwc
| and let A be the rightmost point in Sfwc
. Since
a
a
wc
|Sfa | > |Sna | there exists an interval s ∈ S that does not
contain the true value but contains A. Let Nsmall be the set
of fa smallest intervals. If s ∈ Nsmall for all such s then
Sfwc
is achievable if Nsmall is under attack and the theorem
a
follows.
Now suppose there exists an s as above such that
s∈
/ Nsmall . Then there exists an interval ssmall ∈ Nsmall
that is not under attack. If we swap s and ssmall such that
ssmall now contains A and s contains the old interval ssmall ,
s is made correct and ssmall corrupted while preserving the
size of the fusion interval. Since we can do the same for all
such s, |Sfwc
| can be achieved if Nsmall is under attack.
a
Fig. 4(b) gives an example the theorem. The worst-case for
the setup can be achieved when s or ssmall is attacked.
Theorems 3 and 4 suggest that the attacker can gain more
power by corrupting the precise sensors as opposed to the
imprecise. The intuitive explanation is that the uncertainty in
the system increases – attacking imprecise sensors does not
greatly affect the fusion interval since their intervals are large
even when correct; attacking precise sensors, however, leaves
the system with less information as to where the true value is.

IV. S ENSOR S CHEDULING FOR ATTACK -R ESILIENT
S ENSOR F USION
As shown in the previous section, the attacker’s capabilities
vary greatly with the intervals she has compromised and
correct intervals she has seen. In this section we investigate
the impact of communication schedules on the attacker’s performance. Note that interval lengths are the only information
available a priori to the system, hence any schedule will only
be based on those. In this work we consider the two obvious
choices of ordering sensors according to their precision. In
the first, called the Descending schedule, the largest intervals
(i.e., the most inaccurate sensors) are sent first. In contrast,
the Ascending schedule makes the most accurate sensors send
first. Other schedules are considered at the end of this section.
We first note that neither schedule is optimal in all scenarios.
Theorem 1 suggests that it might be better for the attacker
to see large intervals first. Fig. 5(a) illustrates an example
where this is true. Fig. 5(b), however, shows that knowing
the largest interval does not necessarily bring the attacker any
useful information because she can only increase the fusion
interval by overlapping with s1 and s2 . Hence, if she is aware
of s3 when sending her interval she would send aD but that
would be worse than sending aA which would be the case if
the attacker had seen s1 and s2 instead.
Since neither schedule is absolutely better than the other,
we consider the average case. In particular, we examine the
expected length of the fusion interval for each schedule given
fixed sensor precisions. The next subsection describes our
simulation results in testing the usefulness of each schedule.
A. Schedule Comparison
We compare the two schedules by varying the number of
sensors, their accuracies and the number of attacked sensors.
In particular, the number of sensors vary from three to five;
the lengths of the intervals are increased from 5 to 20 by
increments of 3 for each interval. Finally, the number of
attacked sensors is increased from one to dn/2e − 1. For each
setup, we generate all possible combinations of measurements
for all sensors and take the average length of the fusion
interval, i.e., our best estimate of the true expected length of
the fusion interval.5 In our analysis, the system always uses
the sensor fusion algorithm configured for f = dn/2e − 1.
Table I shows the simulation results. Due to the large number of combinations tried, we chose several setups that represent classes of combinations, two per n and fa combination.
It was noticed during the simulations that the expected lengths
of the two schedules are similar when interval sizes were
comparable, while they tend to get further apart when there
are large differences in sizes. Regardless of the gap between
the two lengths, the expected length under the Descending
schedule was never smaller than that under Ascending.
B. Case Study
In addition to the simulations shown in the previous section,
we also illustrate our results with a case-study. For this pur5 Note that we have discretized the real line with a sufficiently high precision
in order to compute the expectation in the optimization problem.

TABLE I
C OMPARISON OF TWO SENSOR COMMUNICATION SCHEDULES .

n = 3, fa = 1,
L = {5, 11, 17}
n = 3, fa = 1,
L = {5, 11, 11}
n = 4, fa = 1,
L = {5, 8, 17, 20}
n = 4, fa = 1,
L = {5, 8, 8, 11}
n = 5, fa = 1,
L = {5, 5, 5, 5, 20}
n = 5, fa = 1,
L = {5, 5, 5, 14, 20}
n = 5, fa = 2,
L = {5, 5, 5, 5, 20}
n = 5, fa = 2,
L = {5, 5, 5, 14, 17}

E |SN ,f |
Ascending

E |SN ,f |
Descending

10.77

13.58

9.43

10.16

7.66

8.75

6.32

6.53

5.4

5.57

6.33

7.03

5.22

5.31

6.87

7.74

pose, we use four sensors on the LandShark robot [9] (Fig. 6).
The LandShark is commonly used in hostile environments to
save injured people or carry other cargo. It has four sensors
that estimate its speed – GPS, two encoders and a camera.
The size of the GPS and camera intervals were determined
empirically – the LandShark was driven in the open and largest
deviations from actual speed were recorded for both the GPS
and camera speed estimates. The encoders’ intervals were
determined based on their manufacturer specification.
We simulated the scenario with three LandSharks in a
platoon moving away from enemy territory. The leader sets
a speed target v mph for all three vehicles based on the
environment. Each LandShark has a low-level controller that
tries to keep the speed at v mph. There are two additional
restrictions on each vehicle – speed cannot exceed v + δ1 mph
as that may make the LandShark go too fast and unable to
stop fast enough (either of the last two LandSharks may collide
with the one in front or the leader may crash into an obstacle).
Furthermore, speed is not to drop below v − δ2 mph as that
may cause a LandShark to collide with the one behind. These
constraints are encoded into the fusion interval – if its upper
bound exceeds v + δ1 mph or the lower bound is less than
v − δ2 mph then a high-level algorithm will preempt the lowlevel controller to guarantee safety of the vehicles.
We assume that at most one sensor can be attacked at any
given point of time. In addition, while it is true that some
sensors are easier to spoof than others, we assume that any
sensor can be attacked in this scenario; if it is known which
sensor is being attacked then any schedule that places that
sensor first would result in a smaller fusion interval.
Simulations were run with a desired speed of v = 10 mph,
and δ1 = δ2 = 0.5 mph. As noted above, the GPS and camera
interval sizes were determined empirically and are 1 mph
and 2 mph, respectively. Each encoder’s interval size was
computed based on an encoder with 192 cycles per revolution,
a measuring error of 0.5% and sampling jitter error of 0.05%.
The final interval length was computed to be 0.2 mph.
Table II shows the results. In addition to the Ascending and
Descending schedules, we include a Random schedule that
changes transmission order in every step. For each schedule we

(a) An example where the Ascending schedule is better for the system.

(b) An example where the Descending schedule is better for the system.

Fig. 5. Two examples that show that neither schedule is better in all situations. The first column shows the measurements by the sensors, including the
attacked one. The other columns contain the intervals sent to the controller, and the corresponding fusion interval.
TABLE II
C ASE STUDY RESULTS FOR EACH OF THE THREE SCHEDULES .
More than 10.5 mph
Less than 9.5 mph

Ascending
0%
0%

Descending
17.42%
17.65%

Random
5.72%
5.97%

Fig. 6. LandShark vehicle [9].

compute the percentage of runs in which the fusion interval’s
upper bound was above 10.5 mph and the percentage of runs
in which its lower bound was less than 9.5 mph.
C. Discussion
The cases discussed in Theorem 1 are only sufficient and
not necessary conditions for the existence of an optimal attack
policy. Yet, simulations suggest that their intuition generalizes
well – it is in general better for the attacker to know where the
most imprecise intervals are so that she can attack on one side
of them while the correct intervals would be on the other side,
thus confusing the controller. This argument is also supported
by Theorems 3 and 4, which suggest that the attacker will gain
more power by compromising the most precise intervals.
Based on these results and observations, we argue that the
controller will benefit from the Ascending schedule. This is
especially true when there is a significant difference in size
between small and large intervals, in which case the attacker
can take advantage of seeing the large intervals first. This
schedule makes sure that even if the attacker compromises
the most precise sensors she will be forced to send first and
will have to guess the position of the correct intervals.
At the same time, we note that often the fusion interval
depends more on the position of the intervals than on their
lengths (Fig. 5(b) is a good example of this). Hence any
schedule that the controller picks will perform with various
accuracy depending on the positions of the intervals.
One could also argue that imposing a scheduling order
would make it easier for the attacker to know which sensors

would be most useful to attack. This argument, however, could
be made about any schedule that the attacker may know in
advance. A way to prevent such a situation is to change the
schedule constantly. This approach is addressed in Table II,
which shows that constantly changing the schedule and using
a Random schedule results in a larger number of critical speed
violations than always using the Ascending schedule.
One last consideration when designing a communication
schedule is the likelihood that certain sensors can be attacked.
In particular, an IMU is in general much harder to spoof than
a GPS or a camera. In cases like these, where the system is
confident that some sensors are correct, our analysis shows
that they should always be placed last in the schedule, thus
preventing the attacker from knowing their measurements.
V. C ONCLUSION
This work described a general sensor fusion algorithm
for multiple sensors measuring the same physical value. We
introduced security issues by formalizing an attack policy
that tries to maximize the size of the fusion interval while
staying undetected. Furthermore, we proposed a communication schedule, namely the Ascending schedule, that aims
to minimize the attacker’s capabilities by either providing
her with little information (sending at the beginning of the
schedule) or little power (large intervals). We presented worstand average-case results that support our choice of schedule
and validated our results in simulation and a case study.
Since we assumed uncompromised sensors always provide
correct measurements, an extension of this work will introduce
random faults in addition to attacks.
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